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Clients in treatment for Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) were compared to a control group to assess the
extent and nature of imagery during worry or while thinking about a personally relevant positive future event.
Two methods were used to assess mentation and were completed in counter balanced order within the worry
and positive conditions. One method assessed the occurrence of imagery by requiring participants to
categorize their mentation as verbal thoughts or images every 10 s. The other method involved participants
estimating the duration of any imagery that occurred in the previous 10 s. Imagery during worry occurred less
often than while thinking about a positive event for both groups, but GAD clients had a more pronounced
deficit of imagery during worry than the control group. Images that occurred were briefer during worry than
while thinking about a positive future event and were briefer in the GAD than the control group for both worry
and positive conditions. The results thus confirmed that imagery is less common during worry in clients with
GAD but also demonstrated that the imagery that does occur in GAD is briefer.
Keywords: generalized anxiety disorder, worry, imagery, verbal thoughts, cognitive avoidance theory
The defining feature of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is
chronic, excessive, and uncontrollable worry about multiple topics
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Subjectively, worry is
often experienced as being like talking to oneself about potential
negative outcomes, and studies assessing the form of mentation
that occurs during worry typically reveal an excess of verbal
thoughts over images. Borkovec and Inz (1990) employed a men-
tation sampling method to examine the occurrence of verbal
thoughts versus images among GAD clients and nonanxious con-
trols during worry and relaxation. Three samples of mentation type
were taken during each condition and revealed that during worry,
both GAD clients and nonanxious controls reported similarly high
levels of verbal thoughts as opposed to images. In contrast, when
engaging in relaxation, the control group had higher levels of
imagery than verbal thought, whereas the GAD group reported
images or verbal thought equally as often. Using a different
method, Behar, Zuellig, and Borkovec (2005) asked volunteers to
rate the percentage of the time they had noticed the occurrence of
imagery or verbal thoughts during the previous five minutes of
relaxation or worry. Again worry was associated with a predom-
inance of verbal thought over imagery, and relaxation was asso-
ciated with equal proportion of imagery and verbal thoughts for
both nonselected volunteers and others selected for symptoms of
GAD. These findings have been replicated using questionnaires
(Freeston, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1996) and interviews (Hoyer,
Becker, & Roth, 2001).
The cognitive avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, Alcaine, &
Behar, 2004) posits that images of negative future events during
worry are avoided by engaging in worrisome verbal thoughts.
Consequently, verbal thought predominates during worry. One
unintended consequence of this is that worry-related thoughts are
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http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.more likely to intrude again later, thus perpetuating the worry
cycle (see Stokes & Hirsch, 2010; Hirsch, Perman, Mathews,
Borkovec, & Hayes, in preparation). However, evidence from
studies examining the overall proportion of imagery compared to
verbal thinking does not reveal whether or how any such avoid-
ance might actually be manifested during worry. If avoidance of
emotional imagery is a well established habit, then it might be that
images occur only very infrequently during worry, or, if worry
mentation switches rapidly between imagery and verbal thought, it
could be that images occur quite frequently in worry but are very
brief. In order to better understand imagery during worry, it is thus
important to assess both the occurrence and duration of imagery
during worry. To accomplish this goal in the present study, two
mentation assessment methods were employed during separate
phases of the experiment. During one phase, the occurrence of
images was assessed via frequent mentation sampling (every 10 s)
during worry. During the other phase, the duration of any images
that occurred was assessed.
Worry involves thinking about personally relevant and poten-
tially negative future events. Given this, an appropriate control
condition to test the extent that any effects found are specific to
worry involves thinking about another personally relevant future
event that is not related to worry. Consequently, in the present
study each participant’s current worrying was compared to think-
ing about a personally relevant future positive event. In order to
assess whether any differences in the form of mentation during
worry or when thinking about a personally relevant positive future
are evident in people without GAD, a community control group
was also included.
In summary, the present study was designed to assess whether
images during worry occur less often, or are briefer, than images
generated when thinking about a personally relevant future posi-
tive event, and whether any such differences are more marked in
clients with GAD than in a non-GAD control group.
Method
Design
Types of imagery assessment (occurrence and duration) and
type of condition (worry and positive topics) were administered in
counterbalanced order across participants within GAD and control
groups. A filler task was used to separate worry and positive
conditions.
Participants
Forty participants were selected for this study: 20 who met
diagnostic criteria for GAD and 20 community volunteers who
comprised the control group. GAD participants were patients who
were receiving current treatment for GAD and had been recruited
via either the South London & Maudsley National Health Service
Trust or an advertisement placed in a local London newspaper for
clients in treatment for GAD. Such participants initially completed
a screening of the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire
(GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) and were invited to take part in
the study if they met screening criteria for GAD and were currently
undergoing a recognized form of treatment for GAD (e.g., medi-
cation; psychological therapy). No participant reported that their
treatment had involved discussing imagery about their worry. To
be included in the GAD group, on the day of testing participants
had to meet current criteria for GAD on both the GAD-Q-IV and
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Axis I Disorders
(SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996)
1. Community
volunteers were recruited through a pool of people from the local
community who had previously indicated that they were interested
in taking part in psychological research or from King’s College
London. No participant in the control group met GAD criteria on
the GAD-Q-IV or the SCID-I.
There were 6 males and 14 females in the GAD group, and 7
males and 13 females in the control group, with no difference in
gender distribution between the groups (
2  0.11, df  1, p 
.74). The average age was 41.65 years (SD  12.89) in the GAD
group and 41.15 years (SD  11.60) in the control group, with no
significant difference between groups, t(38)  0.13, p  .90. The
average level of education was 14.70 years (SD  2.20) in the
GAD group and 15.10 years (SD  2.47) in the control group,
t(38)  0.54, p  .59. As would be expected, the GAD group had
significantly higher scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), with M 
66.18, SD  9.96 for the GAD group, M  37.65, SD  6.85 for
the control group, t(38)  10.56, p  .001; the State–Trait Anxiety
Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Ja-
cobs, 1983), with M  58.74, SD  8.87 for the GAD group, M 
39.60, SD  5.45 for the control group, t(38)  8.17, p  .001;
and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, &
Emery, 1979), with M  18.45, SD  9.28 for the GAD group,




Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV).
The GAD-Q-IV (Newman et al., 2002) is a self-report measure
designed to screen for generalized anxiety disorder that has good
test–retest reliability, convergent and discriminant validity, and a
high level of diagnostic agreement with a clinical assessor on the
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS; Brown, Di Nardo,
& Barlow, 1994). The dimensional scoring system was used,
which has a good level of diagnostic agreement with a clinical
assessor on the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (Brown, Di
Nardo, & Barlow, 1994).
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV Axis I Disorders
(SCID-I). The SCID-I (First et al., 1996) is a clinician admin-
istered semistructured diagnostic interview used to classify
DSM–IV Axis I disorders which has been shown to have high
levels of interrater and test–retest reliability (Zanarini et al., 2000).
The SCID was used to assess diagnostic criteria for GAD.
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ). Trait worry
level was measured using the PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990), a
1 We included other sections of the SCID-I as necessary to ensure that
excessive worry was evident for multiple worry topics that were unrelated
to other Axis 1 disorders from which that person may have been suffering.
All participants in the GAD Group met diagnostic criteria for GAD on both
the clinical interview and the GAD-Q-IV.
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I start worrying, I can’t stop”), each with a 5-point answer scale
ranging from 1 (not at all typical of me)t o5( very typical of me),
yielding a total score ranging from 16 to 80, with higher scores
indicating greater worry levels. The PSWQ has high internal
consistency, retest reliability, and convergent- and criterion-related
validity (Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; Davey, 1993).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Version (STAI-T).
Trait anxiety was measured using the STAI-T (Spielberger et al.,
1983), consisting of 20 anxiety symptoms that participants rate for
frequency of occurrence. Scores range between 20 and 80, with a
higher score indicating greater anxiety. The STAI-T has good
internal consistency and test–retest reliability (Barnes, Harp, &
Jung, 2002).
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Depressive symptoms
were measured using the BDI (Beck et al., 1979), consisting of 21
depression-related questions that participants rate according to
how they have been feeling during the past two weeks. Scores
range between 0 and 63, with a higher score indicating greater
depression. The BDI has good internal consistency and test–retest
reliability (Beck & Steer, 1984).
Mood ratings. Two visual analogue mood rating scales, each
100 mm in length, assessed current anxiety (anxious–relaxed
scale) and depression (sad–happy scale). Scales were labeled
“extremely anxious” or “extremely depressed” at one end and
“extremely relaxed” or “extremely happy” at the other end. Par-
ticipants placed a cross (x) on each scale, and scores were assigned
by measuring its position, ranging from 0 (extremely anxious/
depressed) to 100 (extremely relaxed/happy).
Imagery Assessment Tasks
Topic identification. In the worry condition, participants
were asked to think of a personally relevant current worry topic.
The experimenter then asked a series of questions for about 2 min
following the form, “What would be bad about that?” to identify
and prime salient aspects of the topic (Davey & Levy, 1998; Vasey
& Borkovec, 1992). The positive condition followed the same
format for each imagery task, except that participants were re-
quired to identify a personally relevant positive topic, and the
corresponding questions took the form, “What would be good
about that?” (Startup & Davey, 2001). A written record was made
of worry and positive topics. Later an assessor, who was not
informed about group allocation or topic type, rated the valence of
the topic summaries on a 6-point scale with the following markers:
3 “high negativity”; 2 “medium negativity”; 1 “low nega-
tivity”; 1 “low positivity”; 2 “medium positivity”; and 3 “high
positivity.” Another assessor rated 16 participants’ worry and
positive thought topics in the same way to provide interrater
reliability. The interrater reliability was k  0.84 on the worry
topic categorization and k  0.95 on the positive topic categori-
zation.
Imagery occurrence task. For the imagery occurrence task,
participants were instructed that thinking about this topic would be
their main task but that computer-generated beeps would be heard
every 10 s. Whenever a beep occurred, participants were required
to indicate whether their mentation at that moment was in imagery
or verbal form by saying “imagery” or “verbal.” Participants
responded to 18 beeps over 3 min.
Imagery duration task. For the imagery duration task, par-
ticipants were again instructed that thinking about the identified
topic would be their main task but that computer-generated beeps
would be heard every 10 s. Whenever a beep occurred, participants
were required to estimate the duration of any imagery that had
occurred in the previous 10 s. To assist participants in making this
estimation, they were given a sheet with a rating scale 10 cm in
length with the word “beep” at each end to illustrate the 10-s
interval between beeps, as well as the following markers: 0 “no
images”; 1 “images very quick, like a flash”; 5 “images lasted
about half the time”; and 10 “images lasted the whole time.”
Participants were instructed that every time they heard a beep they
should say a number between 0 and 10 to indicate the average
duration of any images during the previous 10 s. Participants
responded to 18 beeps over 3 min.
Filler Task
To reduce the likelihood of carry-over effects across the worry
and positive conditions, we administered the unrelated filler task of
listening to music (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh,
2006). This task required participants to listen to a set of 15
classical music extracts, each lasting 40 s. Following each section
of music, participants were asked to rate how pleasant they found
it on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 indicated “extremely unpleasant”
and 9 “extremely pleasant.” This task lasted for 10 min.
Experimental Apparatus
A Sony VAIO laptop computer with E-Prime software version
1 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to admin-
ister all experimental tasks. An Olympus WS-200S digital voice
recorder was used to record participants’ expanded descriptions for
imagery content that occurred during the imagery occurrence task.
Procedure
All participants first completed a consent form, the PSWQ,
STAI-T, BDI, GAD-Q-IV, and mood rating scales. They were then
given an explanation of what was meant by an image versus a
verbal thought: “Images are when you are generating a picture in
your mind and really concentrating on what you can see, feel,
smell, hear, and taste in the image. Images are often very vivid
because you’re tuning into all of your senses. Verbal thoughts are
when you’re thinking using words and silently talking to yourself,
like an internal running commentary or dialogue. When you’re
thinking in verbal thoughts you are thinking in words and sen-
tences.” They were informed that if their mental activity was ever
concurrently in both images and verbal formats, they should report
the more dominant form.
After instructions for the first type of imagery assessment task
(occurrence or duration), participants practiced using a neutral
topic requiring the participant to respond to three beeps that
occurred during 10-s intervals for 30 s. They then received instruc-
tions for the second type of imagery assessment task and practiced
using another neutral topic, which again required them to respond
to each of three beeps, with one beep every 10 s. When it was clear
that instructions for both types of imagery assessment were un-
derstood, participants identified the first topic (worry or positive
240 HIRSCH, HAYES, MATHEWS, PERMAN, AND BORKOVECcondition, depending on order assignment), followed by the oc-
currence and duration tasks for that topic. Each task was admin-
istered in succession followed by mood rating scales. After the
filler task and another set of mood rating scales, participants
identified their second topic followed by both imagery assessment
tasks and the mood rating scales. Finally, the SCID-I was admin-
istered by a clinical psychologist and recorded for later rating by
another clinician
2. Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked for
their time, and paid £20 ($30).
Results
Topic Valence Ratings
To rule out the possibility that any results could be attributed to
differences in the valence of the worry and/or positive topics chosen
by the two groups, assessor topic valence ratings were analyzed using
Fisher’s exact tests for worry and positive topics separately. There
were no significant group differences on topic valence for either the
worry or positive conditions (Fisher’s exact tests, p  1.00 for worry
and p  .82 for positive conditions). Additionally, Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test conducted within groups showed that the assessor’s ratings
for the positive topic were significantly higher than the ratings for the
worry topic in both the GAD (Mdn  2.00, Mdn  2.00, Z 
4.00, p  .001) and Control (Mdn  2.00, Mdn  2.00, Z 
4.01, p  .001) groups.
Imagery Occurrence
A mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the number of images
reported during the imagery occurrence task, with a between-
participants factor of Group (GAD vs. Control) and the repeated
measures factor of Topic (Worry vs. Positive). See Table 1 for means
and standard deviations. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of Group, F(1, 38)  8.53, p  .01, f
2  0.47, reflecting the
fact that the GAD group had fewer images than the Control group
(M  9.63 vs. M  13.23). There was also a significant main effect
of Topic, F(1, 38)  75.91, p  .001, f
2  1.41, with all participants
having fewer images when worrying than when thinking about a
personally relevant positive topic (M  9.08 vs. M  13.78). Impor-
tantly that there was a significant interaction between Group and
Topic, F(1, 38)  13.07, p  .005, f
2  0.59. Significantly fewer
images were reported by the GAD group than the Control group
during the Worry condition, M  6.3 vs. M  11.85; t(38)  4.23,
p  .001, d  1.39, whereas there was no difference in the number
of images reported by the groups during the Positive condition, M 
12.95 vs. M  14.6; t(38)  1.20, p  .24, d  0.38.
Imagery Duration
A mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the average esti-
mated duration of images reported by participants during the
imagery duration task, with a between-participants factor of Group
and the repeated measures factor of Topic. See Table 2 for means
and standard deviations. This analysis revealed a significant main
effect of Group, F(1, 38)  6.81, p  .05, f
2  0.42, reflecting the
fact that the GAD group reported significantly briefer images than
the Control group (M  3.64 s vs. M  5.42 s). There was also a
significant main effect of Topic, F(1, 38)  29.67, p  .001, f
2 
0.88, with all participants reporting briefer images when worrying
than when thinking about a positive topic (M  3.75 s vs. M 
5.31 s). The interaction between Group and Topic failed to reach
significance, F(1, 38)  2.36, p  .13, f
2  0.25.
Self-Reported Mood Before and After Imagery Tasks
A mixed-model ANOVA was carried out separately on the
anxious–relaxed mood rating scales administered to participants
following the imagery occurrence and duration tasks for each
topic. There was one between-participants factor of Group and the
repeated measures factors of Topic (Worry and Positive) and
Imagery Task (Occurrence vs. Duration). These analyses revealed
a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 38)  44.90, p  .001,
f
2  1.09. This reflected greater levels of anxiety reported by the
GAD group than the Control group (M  4.74, SD  1.57 vs. M 
7.72, SD  1.22). There was also a significant main effect of Topic,
F(1, 38)  39.72, p  .001, f
2  1.02. This reflected greater anxiety
in the Worry condition than the Positive condition (M  5.24, SD 
2.65 vs. M  7.22, SD  1.85). There was no main effect of Imagery
Task, F(1, 38)  3.75, p  .06, f
2  0.31. No interactions reached
significance: Group and Topic, F(1, 38)  3.24, p  .08, f
2  0.29;
Group and Imagery Task, F(1, 38)  1.03, p  .32, f
2  0.16; Topic
and Imagery Task, F(1, 38)  0.46, p  .50, f
2  0.11; Group, Topic
and Imagery Task, F(1, 38)  1.59, p  .22, f
2  0.20. The same
pattern of results was observed for the sad–happy scales.
Discussion
Imagery occurred less often and was briefer during worrying
than while thinking about a personally relevant future positive
topic. Moreover, imagery occurred even less during worry in GAD
2 Another clinical psychologist who was not informed of group alloca-
tion listened to SCID-I recordings (apart from two where the audio record-
ing was not available due to technical reasons) to assess diagnostic reli-
ability. The two clinicians agreed on the application of the above diagnostic
criteria for all participants.
Table 1
Mean Occurrence of Images Reported by the GAD and Control
Groups During the Worry and Positive Topic Conditions
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Group Worry Positive
GAD 6.30 (2.81) 12.95 (4.37)
Control 11.85 (5.15) 14.60 (4.35)
Table 2
Mean Duration of Images Reported by the GAD and Control
Groups During the Worry and Positive Topic Conditions
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Group Worry Positive
GAD 2.65 (1.05) 4.64 (2.35)
Control 4.86 (2.78) 5.97 (2.72)
241 IMAGERY IN GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDERclients than in community volunteers, although the groups did not
differ in the extent of imagery while thinking about the positive
topic. Thus, for the measure assessing the occurrence of imagery,
clients with GAD had a particularly low incidence of images while
worrying. Borkovec and Inz (1990) had reported that GAD and
control groups did not differ in occurrence of imagery during
worry, but they only sampled mentation three times during the 10
minutes of worry, whereas we sampled mentation every 10 s over
a 3-min period, thus providing more data and greater potential
sensitivity to differences between groups. Alternatively, the longer
and uninterrupted periods of worry allowed in the Borkovec and
Inz (1990) study may have selectively reduced the occurrence of
imagery in the control participants to levels similar to those with
GAD. If so, then perhaps due to the habitual nature of worry in
people with GAD, they may have a strong dominance of verbal
thinking as soon as they engage in worry, while others may
initially have more images and only later do processes that truncate
imagery begin to operate.
In relation to the duration of imagery when it occurred, both
groups had briefer images during worry than while thinking about
a positive topic, but the GAD group reported briefer images than
controls for both worry-related and positive topics. Hence,
whereas worry is generally associated with shorter images, clients
with GAD have an even stronger and more general tendency to
experience truncated imagery. This finding suggests that those
with GAD may have adopted a general mentation style favoring
verbal thinking over imagery, and although this is most marked
during worry, it can extend to nonworry topics as well. Alterna-
tively, it may be that some participants in the GAD group engaged
in worry even while supposedly thinking about an unrelated topic,
as has been documented by Startup and Davey (2001). For exam-
ple, GAD clients might find themselves worrying that an activity
that should be enjoyable might turn out to have a disastrous
outcome. Either way, whereas worry in general is associated with
a tendency for images to be truncated relative to thinking about a
positive topic, brief imagery is particularly characteristic of those
with GAD.
Given that GAD is highly comorbid, it is possible that the
findings may be accounted for by other diagnoses, although these
are typically associated with prolonged rather than truncated neg-
ative imagery (e.g., social phobia; Hackmann, Clark, & McManus,
2000). Future research is needed to determine whether similar
effects would be evident for worry in other psychiatric disorders.
We investigated two emotionally relevant personal topics, but
future research could usefully include neutral topics.
Why do GAD clients experience only very brief imagery? Those
with GAD may have already learned to adopt a more verbal mode
of thinking as a general strategy to reduce the distress caused by
those emotional images that they find particularly distressing. This
strategy to truncate imagery could be further encouraged by the
erroneous belief that worry is akin to problem solving (Borkovec
& Roemer, 1995), which may motivate a more verbal linguistic
style of processing. If a habit of truncating imagery is already well
established by the time GAD is diagnosed, the habit may have
generalized somewhat to all topics and thus be applied to content
not originally associated with worry, as was found here. That is, as
the truncation of imagery becomes relatively automated, verbal
thinking will become the habitual default manner of mentation
about any personally relevant topics. However, even if this effec-
tively reduces the occurrence and duration of negative images in
general, it may be that for negative images in particular this
process of truncation is more frequently rehearsed, thus leading to
even briefer images for worry-related images than positive images.
Given that imagery has been shown to be particularly brief in
GAD, clients with this clinical problem may benefit from engaging
in more prolonged imagery of worry content (i.e., what they fear
will happen), as is encouraged by some forms of cognitive behav-
ior therapy for GAD (e.g., Craske, Barlow, & Leary, 1992).
Indeed, our own research has shown that when high worriers are
instructed to think about their worry in imagery form, they have
fewer subsequent negative intrusions than after worrying in their
normal verbal manner (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010; Hirsch et al., in
preparation). If the increased frequency of intrusions that follow
verbal worrying has the undesired effect of precipitating new bouts
of worry and thus maintains the symptoms of GAD, then reversing
this process, for example by encouraging prolonged imagery of
worry content, is likely to prove beneficial.
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